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Summary and Introduction 
The paper will discuss the potential role of 
lead markets in the global process of eco-
logical modernisation, here conceived as 
innovation and diffusion of environmental 
friendly technologies, including the innova-
tion and diffusion of supporting national poli-
cies. This includes the question whether 
and how national pioneer roles in environ-
mental policy can be played in times of eco-
nomic globalisation.  
Global Environmental Change in the direc-
tion of sustainability strongly depends on in-
ternational markets for environmental 
friendly technologies. Such markets need 
national "lead markets" as a starting point. A 
lead market is the country that adopts an 
innovation that subsequently adopted 
worldwide (Beise 2001). Lead markets are 
empirically characterised by high per-capita 
income, demanding and innovative buyers, 
high quality standards, political pressure for 
change and flexible, innovation-friendly 
framework conditions for producers and us-
ers. Unlike lead markets for normal techni-
cal innovations, environment-friendly tech-
nologies are specific insofar as they are 
problem-oriented and depend strongly on 
political influences. The problem dimension 
constitutes a potential global demand in 
terms of global environmental needs. It is 
mainly the role of pioneer countries to 
stimulate both, environmental innovation 
and their global diffusion, often in co-
operation with international institutions and 
organisations. The interplay of innovation 
and diffusion of technology and policy takes 
place in different forms (from technology 
forcing to technology-based policies).  
It is the high income countries which are 
able to afford the necessary investments in 
R&D for the development of new technolo-
gies. Many of them have also the demand 
conditions that enable environmental lead 
markets. These markets have to deal with 
the teething troubles of innovations, and 
they have to provide the pay back of R&D 
investments. They demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of technologies on a large scale applica-
tion. Lead markets are not only related to 
potential first mover advantages, they also 
can attract foreign investors for environ-
mental friendly technologies.  
The paper is explorative in nature, as there 
is a lack of research on the mechanism and 
conditions for the successful making of 
global markets for environmental innova-
tions. It should be understood as an over-
view and systematisation of aspects of 
global ecological modernisation with special 
regard to lead markets for environmental in-
novations. 
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1 Ecological Modernisation 
By "ecological modernisation" we under-
stand the innovation and diffusion of mar-
ketable environmentally (more) applied 
technologies, including the innovation and 
diffusion of supporting policies. The concept 
describes the wide spectrum of possible en-
vironmental improvements that can be 
achieved through innovations beyond the 
purely end-of-pipe approaches. "Ecological 
modernisation" is not only the headline of 
the environmental policy of the present red-
green government of Germany. It is a con-
cept that at present rapidly diffuses, espe-
cially in the field of social sciences. We use 
it in its narrower technical-economic sense. 
Other authors - such as Hajer (1995) or Mol 
(2001) - tend to use a broad definition which 
includes institutional, structural and cultural 
changes of all kind. The main reason for our 
choice is that policies based on technolo-
gies and innovations not only represent a 
large potential of environmental improve-
ments within the market system but are also 
easier to introduce and implement than 
those policies requiring intervention in the 
established production, consumption, trans-
port, or lifestyle structures. We need a spe-
cial term to denote these types of market-
able solutions. If the concept of ecological 
modernisation is restricted in this sense it 
may also be easier to take the limits of the 
"technological" strategy into account, which 
cannot be ignored. 
Figure 1: Model and examples of environmental policy approaches (Jänicke 1985) 
Curative approaches  Preventive approaches  
Repair:  
Reduction / compen-
sation of damage 
End-of-pipe treatment:  
Clean-up technology 
Ecological modernization: 
Clean(er) technology / 
Eco-efficiency 
Structural change:  
Decrease of "dirty" in-
dustries / activities 
Payments for 
noise damage  
Passive noise protection  Less noisy motors  Alternative traffic 




Desulphurisation of coal 
power stations  
More efficient power pro-
duction and consumption; 
CHP; cleaner primary en-
ergy  
Less power-intensive 









damage caused by 
industrial waste  
Waste incineration  Recycling  Reduction of waste-
intensive sectors  
 
Ecological modernization starts beyond 
end-of-the pipe approaches (clean-up tech-
nology) and way beyond merely reparative 
measures (see Figure 1). The scope of en-
vironmental friendly technologies varies 
from incremental improvements to radical 
innovation, where innovation means the ini-
tial market introduction of a new technology. 
The latter may improve some or all of the 
phases of a product's life cycle and thereby 
maybe labelled as "clean" or "cleaner" tech-
nology. Incremental improvement affects 
different dimensions such as material inten-
sity (efficient use of resources), energy in-
tensity (efficient use of energy), land use in-
tensity (efficient use of space), transport in-
tensity (efficient logistics), or risk intensity 
(regarding plants, substances, products). 
This involves also waste intensity, i.e. waste 
materials and harmful emissions (Jänicke 
1985). 
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Modernisation in its economic core is a 
process of continuous improvement of pro-
cedures and products. It is a compulsory 
necessity in capitalistic industrial societies 
driven by the forces of competition which 
generates innovative or efficient technolo-
gies. Typically, technological progress is a 
market based process. It is however possi-
ble, and for ecological modernisation a pre-
requisite, to influence the direction of mod-
ernisation. The spread of environmental 
concern can be an important motor for eco-
nomic modernization (Brickwedde 1997). 
Recently, also public agencies adopted this 
view, as for example the Swedish Ministry 
of the environment (1996: 5) argues that 
"environmental policy is contributing to-
wards the modernisation Swedish enter-
prise" or the European Commission: "...high 
environmental standards are an engine for 
innovation and business opportunities" 
(European Commission 2001: 3). This ar-
gument is extended to competitiveness: 
"How an industry responds to environmental 
problems may, in fact, be a leading indicator 
of its overall competitiveness ... Successful 
environmentalists, regulatory agencies, and 
companies will ... build on the underlying 
economic logic that links the environment, 
resources productivity, innovation, and 
competitiveness" (Porter/van der Linde 
1995; cf. Wallace 1995). This argument, 
however, has also been disputed and cer-
tainly needs more empirical evidence and 
more differentiation. 
Unlike the interpretation of N. Ashford 
(2001) - ecological modernisation conceived 
as the transformation of the 'problem indus-
tries' into 'green' industries - our view on 
ecological modernisation, focuses on inno-
vative technologies. The technologies which 
are put on the markets to substitute the en-
vironmental harmful technologies are not 
necessarily produced by the same firm or 
the same industry. For instance firms pro-
ducing technologies for renewable energies 
constituting a new - booming - industry. Our 
view on ecological modernisation is con-
cerned with technologies which are market-
able. For certain environmental problems 
there is, indeed, the necessity of a structural 
change, e.g. the phasing out of nuclear en-
ergy or lignite coal, which cannot be ef-
fected via market mechanism. But the diffi-
culty of this political task is so different that 
we should use a different term: The dichot-
omy between ecological modernisation on 
the one hand and structural change of the 
phasing-out type on the other hand may be 
helpful here. Ecological modernisation – us-
ing the logic of modernisation and markets - 
is the easier policy. It is at best a continuous 
process leading to win-win situations. How-
ever a decrease of an industry in its core 
technologies creating losers and e.g. re-
gional employment problems requires huge 
political endeavour and is therefore possible 
only exceptionally.  
As we will show later ecological modernisa-
tion, too, needs government policy over-
coming market failures. And the policy may 
include the “big stick” as a final resort 
against laggards in the diffusion process 
(see below). But this is, at least from the 
point of view of policy sciences, a quite dif-
ferent task compared to structural solutions. 
The political dimension of  
environmental innovations 
What are the driving forces of this process 
and how can they be reinforced? As a start-
ing point for the analysis, the approaches of 
innovation economics for the explanation of 
innovations may be utilised. However, in 
addition, the special characteristics of envi-
ronmental innovations must be considered. 
Traditional R&D policies do focus on the 
provision of infrastructure needed for the 
generation, transfer, and application of 
knowledge by the state and on the amount 
of subventions for R&D activities. Financial 
aids and research institutions are consid-
ered as the adjusting screws to explain suc-
cess or failure of National Innovation Sys-
tems (NIS) (OECD 1999).  
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For environmental innovations additional 
aspects have to be taken into account, too. 
It is not only the supply of technologies 
which is supported by public R&D policy, 
but also environmental regulations, fre-
quently having a strong influence on the 
demand side that is of special importance. 
Environmental technologies which become 
obligatory as e.g. BAT standards (see 
Hitchens et al., this volume) do have a well 
protected market. But there are many other 
means to support and increase the demand 
for environmental innovations beyond com-
mand and control measures such as e.g. 
tax exemptions or reductions (as for 
unleaded gasoline), labelling schemes (e.g. 
Blauer Engel), public procurement, or 
EMAS (demand of enterprises).  
Innovations both in environmental technol-
ogy and in environmental policy can nowa-
days count on a broad spectrum of transfer 
mechanisms beyond the market which - 
from the OECD, by way of the World Bank, 
right through to Greenpeace - help their dif-
fusion on the world market. Pioneering 
measures taken by states and the interna-
tional orientation along "best practice" lines 
(benchmarking) serve to further reinforce 
these mechanisms. 
To conclude, political strategies, aiming at a 
creation of markets for environmental inno-
vations, can be build on three different ap-
proaches: 1) The improvement of the infra-
structure for the supply with environmental 
innovations; 2) the safeguarding of demand 
by means of environmental policy and 3) the 
utilisation of transfer mechanism to speed 
up the diffusion of policy innovations into 
other countries.  
There are, however, less favourable condi-
tions for environmental innovations. First, 
there is a short-term and most often even 
static perspective on the technological pos-
sibilities of enterprises both by regulators as 
well as managers. Technologies, products 
and preferences are taken as granted and 
possible changes are perceived as provok-
ing additional costs. Thereby, environmental 
policy is oriented on the state of the art 
rather than on the potentials of technolo-
gies. Second, there are many persistent 
reasons for an end-of-pipe orientation of 
environmental technologies. These tech-
nologies are more easy to control, they 
usually do not require a change in central 
processes, there are standardised solutions 
at hand. Furthermore, if substantial invest-
ments in EOP technologies have been 
done, sunk costs have to be depreciated 
before considering more innovative tech-
nologies. Third, due to the externalities of 
innovations and especially environmental 
innovations, there is an undersupply of R&D 
activities. For innovation in general, there is 
an incentive for free riding and to obtain 
second mover advantages. Klaus Rennings 
(2000) has pointed out, that there is a sec-
ond externality of environmental innovation: 
There is an incentive for free riding on the 
environmental benefits of environmental in-
novations because these benefits are a 
public good. Environmental policy therefore 
has been promoting the diffusion of existing 
technologies rather than the stimulation of 
innovations (s.a. Hübner/Nill 2001: 97 f.).  
Considering these peculiarities of environ-
mental innovations it is a task of consider-
able difficulty for politics to implement a pol-
icy which is likely to foster environmental in-
novations. Whereas with "normal" innova-
tions state and politics form only one factor 
among many influencing the framing condi-
tions of the potential innovator, environ-
mental innovations benefit from socio-
political actors (state, also NGOs). It is im-
portant to note, that environmental innova-
tors often orientate their decisions on the 
early phases of public problem definitions 
and the early phases of policy formulation 
rather than wait until a suitable policy has 
been passed and enacted (Jacob/Jänicke 
1998). Innovations cannot be explained by a 
single governmental instrument, but many 
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other factors have been taken into account 
such is the policy style, the actors configura-
tion and the instrumentation (Jänicke et al. 
2000). 
A political strategy should strengthen the 
ecological motivation of potential innovators, 
improve their situation regarding the avail-
able information, and above all cut their in-
vestment risk by providing calculable per-
spectives. A strategy of ecological moderni-
zation will begin with clear target data but 
with "soft" instruments and regard regula-
tions and official directives as the very last 
resort (Wallace 1995; Jacob/Jänicke 1998). 
The guiding axiom is: The more credibly the 
government threatens specifications and 
sanctions right from the outset, the more ef-
fective the "softer" instruments will work. 
This rather management-oriented approach 
is likely to be effective particularly if targeted 
environmental innovations are at stake, for 
which potential innovators and target groups 
can be addressed directly. For a broad 
stimulation of unspecific environmental in-
novations it is necessary to address a wider 
spectrum of potential innovators less spe-
cifically and directly. For the latter type of 
innovation oriented environmental policy 
more traditional means of regulation and 
stimulation seem more appropriate.  
Recently, with a broadly effective set of in-
struments applied as part of innovation-
oriented environmental policy, it has been 
above all environmental levies and energy 
taxes that have gained in significance. Of 
course state provision of the necessary in-
frastructure for research, development, and 
knowledge transfer - as innovation research 
has always stressed - is also critically im-
portant. State-run "green" R&D programs 
play an important and more specific role in 
innovation-oriented pioneer countries (e.g. 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden). 
Another important aspect is cooperative en-
vironmental planning as defined by "Agenda 
21". This encompasses elements of classi-
cal regulation and control and of public 
management systems. The use of strategic 
targets in environmental plans and strate-
gies reduces the insecurities involved in 
suitable innovation processes and offers in-
novators more reliably calculable invest-
ment conditions. If, for example, a hazard-
ous substance has to be withdrawn from the 
market before a specified deadline, the po-
tential supplier of a substitute substance 
has greater certainty with respect to the 
profitability of his research and investment 
planning. Moreover, sustained environ-
mental planning can create motives for in-
novation and marketable solutions insofar 
as it is linked to a broad target-oriented de-
bate on specific problem situations. Strate-
gic environmental planning is usually asso-
ciated with the formation of networks, 
among other things favouring the exchange 
of information so important for innovations. 
For a comprehensive explanation of envi-
ronmental innovations, it is not sufficient to 
look for the political management of single 
innovations only. The overall capacity of na-
tion states, or even regions for innovations 
as well as market demands have to be re-
flected, too. This capacity has been concep-
tualised as "national innovation systems" 
where innovative firms are part of a network 
which encompasses actors from other firms, 
research institutes, universities, etc. (e.g. 
Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; OECD 
1999). The concept of a national innovation 
system is, however, not a consistent theory, 
but it tries to combine a wide range of influ-
encing factors which possibly explain na-
tional and regional differences in innovation 
activities.  
So far, we have dealt with policy factors 
supporting innovation. But ecological mod-
ernisation is both innovation and - hopefully 
- rapid and complete diffusion of available 
and marketable solutions. Therefore, we 
discuss in the following the conditions for 
their diffusion. 
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2 Globalisation and National Environmental Policy Capacity 
The greening of international markets 
strongly depends on national pioneers in 
environmental policy. But is pioneer behav-
iour of nations possible in the context of 
globalisation? Before we turn to the global 
diffusion of environmental innovations we 
should clear this important point. 
Figure 2:  
The Pioneer Countries in Environmental Policy:  
Policy Innovation or Early Adoption 1970-2000(x) 
Country: 1970- 1985 1985 - 2000 
Sweden  (11) 
USA  (10) 
Japan  (9) 
Denmark  (9) 
Finland  (8) 
France  (7) 
Germany  (7) 
The Netherlands (7) 






















 51 29 
(x) Introduction of 20 new environmental policy in-
stitutions, laws or instruments: innovation plus 
first 3 adoptions. Preliminary data 
Source: Busch/Jörgens (FFU) 2001 
 
According to a broad review of literature 
conducted by Thomas Bernauer (2000), 
there are three distinct understandings of 
globalisation. From a constructivist/socio-
logical perspective globalisation encom-
passes political, economic, cultural phe-
nomena of diminishing importance of na-
tional borders (e.g. Giddens 1990). Political 
scientists which also stress the diminishing 
importance of boarders between nation 
states and using the term of denationalisa-
tion (e.g. Zürn 1998). A neo-marxist per-
spective stresses the globalising of capital, 
the dominance of transnational firms, or the 
unleashed world market (e.g. Alt-
vater/Mahnkopf 1996). Finally, from the 
point of view of economists, globalisation re-
fers to the extension of international mar-
kets both in terms of trade and investment 
activities. This is accompanied by an easier 
mobility of factors movements, especially 
the international movement of capital. For 
this paper we are interested in the possibili-
ties and obstacles for the establishment of 
international markets for environmental in-
novations. Since environmental innovation/ 
diffusion as a rule need to be stimulated by 
policies it is crucial to understand not only 
the economic, but also the political dimen-
sions of globalisation and its implications for 
policy making as well.  
There is an ongoing debate about the impli-
cations of globalisation for national policy 
making. Regarding social policy, economic 
policy, but also environmental policy it has 
been argued that a free movement of pro-
duction factors limits the possibilities for na-
tional regulations which lead to rising costs 
for firms and to a competitive disadvantage. 
Globalisation therefore leads to a "race to 
the bottom" or to de-regulation to attract for-
eign investments. This phenomena of de-
regulation became known as the Delaware 
effect of globalisation (Vogel 1995). It was in 
Delaware where competition on deregula-
tion of corporate chartering began. In the US  
charters are granted by individual states, 
but all states are required to recognize each 
other's charter. In the course of this compe-
tition, a race to the bottom was won by De-
laware by lowering the level of protection for 
employees, shareholders, and customers. 
According to David Vogel (1995; 1997; 
2001) economic integration and strict regu-
lation is not as antagonistic as it can be ex-
pected. High standards in important markets 
may force foreign producers to adapt to 
these standards by which foreign govern-
ments react by raising their own standards. 
Furthermore, due to scale effects in produc-
tion but also to obtain the image of an inno-
vative firm, it may be sensible for firms to 
adapt to the higher standards for other mar-
kets as well on a voluntary basis. A promi-
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nent example of this race to the top are en-
vironmental standards set by California 
which lead to a world wide adaptation by car 
manufactures which became known as the 
California effect.  
 
Figure 3: General Characteristics of the Present Pioneer Countries in Environmental Policy (PCEP) 
Definition: PCEPs are innovators or early adopters of new environmental pol-
icy measures that diffuse into other countries (thereby contributing 
to the development of global environmental policy). 
Characteristic  
(Indicator/Measurement): General Hypothesis: 
Environmental policy innovations  
(Policy monitoring, FFU data) Pioneering environmental policy is possible 
Strict environmental regulation  
(e.g. Environmental Regulatory Regime)  
Strict environmental policy is possible  
(s.a. Porter) 
Innovation or early adoption of environmental 
technologies (Monitoring of environmental 
technology diffusion) 
PCEPs having the capabilities for technology 
based environmental strategies and are by 
this candidates for becoming lead markets  
High economic income (GNP/cap.) 
High income means both, high (perceived) 
pressure and high capacity for environmental 
policy  
High competitiveness  
(e.g. Competitiveness Report) 
Environmental issue is important for the com-
petition on innovation 
Open economy (x)  
(export/import ratio of GNP) 
Economic globalisation is no impediment for 
active environmental policy 
Strong role of government (x)  No general "withering away" of governments in times of globalisation 
(x) Mainly true for the present PCEPs (forerunners within the EU, and Canada) 
 
It is a question open to empirical investiga-
tion if this example of a successful conver-
gence of environmental standards on a high 
level of protection may be generalised. It 
has been argued that this mechanism may 
apply to product regulation only (Vogel 
1997; Scharpf 1999). The distinction be-
tween products and processes is not selec-
tive since all process technologies are 
products as well (e.g. wind mills). Empirical 
evidence is given for a spread of industrial 
pollution standards to developing countries 
(Hettige et al. 1996).  
Regarding the expected decline in competi-
tiveness by environmental policy the race-
to-the-bottom hypothesis suffers from sev-
eral highly questionable assumptions: It as-
sumes that environmental regulations im-
pose costs for producers that affect location, 
regardless of differences in labour produc-
tivity. It also assumes that governments re-
act exclusively to the preferences of the in-
ternational capital, ignoring the preferences 
of voters or interest groups (Drezner 2001). 
Last but not least, the race-to-the-bottom 
hypothesis not only overestimates the im-
portance of environmental costs and the dif-
ferences in regulatory costs but also the 
general role of prices, thereby ignoring the 
role of innovation in the global competition. 
The rising importance of the environmental 
issue in the competition on innovations may 
be the most interesting counter argument. 
The Porter Hypotheses on Environ-
mental Regulation and Competitiveness 
The Porter hypothesis argues that a strict 
environmental policy can improve competi-
tiveness of firms and sectors (Porter 1990; 
Porter/van der Linde 1995; s.a. Ashford 
1979) may be split into two distinct parts 
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(s.a. Taistra 2001): First, a competitive ad-
vantage might be achieved in case of a 
strict environmental policy which, at a later 
stage, diffuses internationally. If there has 
been a development of technologies in re-
sponse to strict environmental standards, 
industries (not necessarily the polluting in-
dustry itself), might be able to export their 
technologies. Their competitive advantage 
may be based on learning effects or patent 
protection of their innovation.  
Second, strict environmental policy might 
lead to innovation in the polluting industry it-
self which is able to compensate or even 
overcompensate for the costs of adaptation. 
This part of the Porter hypotheses has been 
labelled the "free-lunch" or even "paid 
lunch" hypotheses.  
This second case refers to inefficient pat-
terns of production. The existence of con-
siderable inefficiencies is not expected by 
conventional economic theory. Possible ex-
planations for the broad empirical evidence 
supporting this part of the hypotheses, 
might be seen in the fact that both regula-
tors and enterprises most often have a 
static view when evaluating the expected 
costs of environmental regulation. Strate-
gies for environmental protection are usually 
are developed on the basis of given tech-
nologies, products and preferences. Policies 
are most often formulated in a short term 
perspective only. All this leads to a policy 
which is based on the state of the art, in-
stead of being oriented on the technical po-
tentials.  
According to Porter, environmental policy 
should choose instruments stimulating inno-
vations which are able to take advantage of 
the potentials of technologies rather than 
stimulating the diffusion of existing tech-
nologies. Furthermore, national environ-
mental standards should be a slight precur-
sor for other countries. However, a wide gap 
between the different national standards 
should be avoided in order to beware of 
idiosyncratic solutions.  
The "Porter hypothesis" has been supported 
by policy science research on environ-
mental pioneer countries (Wallace 1995; 
Jänicke/Weidner 1997; Anderson/Liefferink 
1997). There have been always national 
pioneer countries in environmental policy. In 
the context of globalisation these countries 
have gained additional importance - just in 
opposite to the "race to the bottom" hy-
potheses. They are - possibly more than in-
ternational institutions - the paramount pro-
tagonists of the development of international 
environmental policy. While environmental 
policy is mainly based on technologies, they 
are at the same time supporters of a global 
ecological modernisation. It is mainly a few 
highly developed OECD pioneering national 
states which pushes technology based 
measures for environmental protection. For 
these countries the competition on quality 
which is based on innovation - rather than 
competition on costs - seems to be the pri-
mary push.  
Governments do not have an exit option but 
must react to functional imperatives of their 
countries. In the global competition the na-
tion state is coming under pressure in areas 
such as employment, financial policy, social 
security, infrastructure, R&D policy, and last 
but not least environmental policy. Here the 
(recently renewed) Cameron hypothesis in 
political science may be remembered stat-
ing that open OECD economies tend to a 
higher share of public expenditure (Cam-
eron 1978). The underlying causalities for 
this phenomena may be disputed. We ex-
pect, however, that open economies need 
more government activities, both to enable 
international competition (e. g. by providing 
the infrastructure or an effective innovation 
system) and to counteract its problems (e. 
g. by compensating its losers). This pres-
sure for action operates contrary to a dimin-
ishing importance of national boarders. For 
policy researchers it is no surprise that well 
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developed OECD countries which are highly 
integrated into the world market are also 
more active in environmental policy (see 
Bernauer 2000). The nation state also re-
mains the most competent and best organ-
ised actor (alongside multinational enter-
prises) in the global arena. Empirical evi-
dence for this interlinkage is given by the 
research of Eliste and Fredriksson (1998). 
According to these authors countries with 
an open trade regime do have more strin-
gent environmental regulation.  
While there has been a (most often volun-
tary) transfer of sovereignty to international 
institutions, nation states gained partially 
additional opportunities by concerting glob-
ally their actions (e.g. nature conservation, 
Basel convention, Rio process, but also the 
consolidation of national budgets). There-
fore, the decline of national sovereignty 
should not be confused with a decline of 
capacity to solve national problems.  
There is an ongoing debate in economic re-
search about the question of whether a pio-
neering role in environmental policy influ-
ences the competitiveness of firms, sectors 
or nations. A number of empirical studies on 
technologies, sectors, firms and countries 
have been published which in general sup-
port the expectations of the Porter hypothe-
ses (for an overview: Taistra 2001; further-
more Jaffe et al. 1995; Hübner/Nill 2001; 
Sturm et al. 2000; Esty/Porter 2000).  
All of these investigations are not able to 
model the causal relationship between eco-
nomic and environmental performance. At 
least, the correlations giving further evi-
dence for the thesis that an ambitious envi-
ronmental policy doesn't harm competitive-
ness. Furthermore, they giving evidence 
once again, that a well developed economy 
is a prerequisite for the development of a 
successful environmental policy. It is the 
highly developed countries which are char-
acterised both by high environmental pres-
sure (both objective and subjective, induced 
by high education and income) and high ca-
pacity (encompassing the institutional basis, 
administrative competence, economic/fiscal 
resources, knowledge, and the strength of 
NGOs) to react on it.  
A key mechanism for an integrated ap-
proach which utilises the economic forces of 
globalisation, might be the establishment of 
lead markets for environmental innovations. 
3 Diffusion of Policy Innovations and the Globalisation of Environmental Policy 
As mentioned above, the international diffu-
sion of clean(er) technologies strongly de-
pends on the diffusion of their supporting 
policies. Therefore, the role of environ-
mental policy diffusion is relevant in our 
context. Recent comparative research on 
the spread of environmental policy among 
countries reveals an astonishing interna-
tional convergence in the development of 
national policy patterns (Kern 2000; Jörgens 
1996; Kern/Jörgens/Jänicke 1999). It is 
possible, by way of policy monitoring, to 
treat innovations in environmental policy as 
indicators and evaluate these accordingly 
(from the establishment of an environment 
ministry right through to the introduction of a 
CO2 tax). It is also possible in the same 
way to assess the significance of pioneer 
countries and the role of certain strategic 
countries without which rapid diffusion 
would not succeed. This procedure also al-
lows us to deduce, from the diffusion rate, 
the level of difficulty involved in solving a 
problem. Monitoring individual policy meas-
ures in this way (as policy output) is of 
course not a proper policy outcome evalua-
tion; but the method of empirically describ-
ing national and global policy developments 
with the aid of policy indicators can still be 
considered a step forward in environmental 
policy research. 
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The result shows, for example, that the 
globalisation of environmental policy, insofar 
as this is reflected at state level, can indeed 
be described using the analytic concept of 
innovation diffusion: Standard solutions in 
certain pioneer countries are diffused 
worldwide, thus causing a substantial 
measure of convergence in policy formula-
tion at national state level - irrespective of 
extremely different capacities for action. 
Unlike in the 1970s, when for example the 
USA or Japan had a major innovative func-
tion in global environmental policy, nowa-
days innovations in environmental policy 
emerge strikingly often in small EU coun-
tries tightly integrated in the global market 
(Jänicke 1998).  
The - reformed - institutional fabric of the 
EU seems comparatively favourable both 
for innovations and for their diffusion (Hérit-
ier et al. 1994). The EU must firstly, at least 
in principle, accept a "high level of protec-
tion" in member states; it must secondly 
seek to harmonize innovations in environ-
mental policy implemented at national state 
level. Pioneer countries, for their part, often 
have an interest in anchoring their policy in-
novations within the EU framework in order 
to thus minimize their subsequent need to 
adapt to European policy. It is also often a 
matter of "Europeanizing" certain national 
pioneer measures favouring the particular 
country's domestic industry. Policy diffusion 
within the EU, however, takes place not only 
by way of EU harmonization but also from 
country to country. In the latter case the pol-
icy innovation in question will often need 
first to be introduced by one of the more in-
fluential EU countries before it achieves the 
necessary widespread impact. For example, 
the CO2/energy tax was already introduced 
in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries in the early 1990s - but it seems 
that the decisive push towards European 
diffusion has been the adoption of a green 
tax by the red-green coalition government in 
Germany in 1998. The CO2 tax is an exam-
ple of "horizontal" diffusion. It has yet to be 
established as a European measure. 
The diffusion of innovations in environ-
mental policy thus takes place both directly 
from one country to another, i.e. by way of 
imitative policy learning or "lesson drawing" 
(Rose 1993) and by way of international in-
stitutions (e.g. OECD, UNEP, World Bank), 
organizations (e.g. Greenpeace), or expert-
networks (e.g. the International Network of 
Green Planners). It is striking how rapidly 
many innovations in environmental policy 
are diffused. Environment ministries have, 
in a period of just under 30 years, clearly 
asserted their position in the industrialized 
countries. Environmental plans, as defined 
under "Agenda 21", just ten years after the 
Rio Conference (1992), are going to be 
more or less in place worldwide - though in 
extremely disparate quality. However, in 
other cases (e.g. soil protection legislation) 
the diffusion rate is clearly curbed by the dif-
ficulty of solving the problems involved. 
It can be expected that a high capacity for 
environmental policy is needed both for pol-
icy innovation and the adoption of innova-
tions. The OECD defines it broadly as "a 
society's ability to identify and solve envi-
ronmental problems" (OECD 1994: 8). 
While the term capacity and capacity build-
ing was used previously by numerous insti-
tutions such as UNEP, FAO, World Bank, 
OECD, and others in connection with less 
developed countries only, it has been fruit-
fully extended to industrialised countries as 
well (Jänicke/Weidner 1997; Weidner/Jä-
nicke 2002). It refers to the structural pre-
conditions for successful environmental pol-
icy and encompasses the collective actors 
(esp. environmental institutions and organi-
sations). The structural preconditions in-
clude (a) the institutional set-up (e. g. open 
and effectively integrated political institu-
tions, administrative competence), (b) the 
system of creation, transfer and application 
of knowledge and (c) the economic-
technical basis. 
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4 The Interplay between the Diffusion of Environmental Policy Innovations and 
Environmental Technology 
There is a highly symbiotic fabric of inter-
woven interests between innovators in 
technology and policy makers. Suppliers of 
environmental technology seek the support 
of politicians and politicians are always look-
ing out for technological options, because 
precisely these are much easier to imple-
ment than any sort of structural intervention. 
However, the interplay between environ-
mental policy and environmental technology 
in the case of innovation diffusion is charac-
terized by a wide variety of possible constel-
lations. Theoretically it is possible to distin-
guish between the following diffusion sce-
narios, depending on the factors leading to 
the political and technological innovations: 









Policy induced Diffusion Technology induced Diffusion
• Technology Forcing A ⇒ B ⇒ C ⇒ D • Technological Initiative B ⇒ A ⇒ C ⇒ D
• Political Initiative A ⇒ B ⇒ D ⇒ C • Technological Dominance B ⇒ A ⇒ D ⇒ C
e.g. Cadmium substitutes e.g. CHP technologies
• Political Dominance A ⇒ C ⇒ B ⇒ D • Autonomous Diffusion B ⇒ D
no example yet ? e.g. Incremental improvements of energy efficiency
e.g. US-Car Emission Standards (1970) e.g. wind energy
 
Technology forcing (A⇒B⇒C⇒D): A national environmental policy innovation in one country forces a technological 
innovation which diffuses if also the policy innovation is diffused (e.g.: catalytic converter technology in cars). 
Technological initiative (B⇒A⇒C⇒D): A new but already existing environmental technology induces a political in-
novation whose diffusion in turn encourages the diffusion of the technology (e.g.: wind mills). 
Political initiative (A⇒B⇒D⇒C): A national environmental policy leads to technological innovations whose diffusion 
in turn encourages diffusion of the policy innovation (e.g.: cadmium substitute 1). 
Technological dominance (B⇒A⇒D⇒C): An innovation in environmental technology is successfully diffused and as 
a result receives political support both nationally and internationally (e.g.: combined heat and power in industry 2). 
Political dominance (A⇒C⇒B⇒D): The innovation in environmental policy is successfully diffused before a corre-
sponding technology is available (this scenario is, symptomatically, very rare in ecological modernization). 
Autonomous technological development (B⇒D): An innovation in environmental technology is successfully diffused 
without political influence; this case, beyond incrementally increasing energy efficiency in companies, seems to be 
rather rare. 
                                            
1 The use of cadmium was regulated in Sweden in the early 1980s with their standards for substitutes being adopted by 
European industry. Not until the early 1990s, however, were these standards made binding by the European Commission 
(Bätcher/Böhm/Tötsch 1992).  
2 Combined heat and power (CHP) in industry spread largely autonomously, even though regulatory measures were intended 
to encourage its use in public power stations. 
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Technological innovations do provide addi-
tional options for policy makers. For other 
cases, policy factors have been the major 
driving forces in the stimulation of environ-
ment-friendly technical innovations. The 
case of technology forcing has, however, 
been exceptional for environmental innova-
tion (cf. Conrad 1998; Jacob 1999). So far, 
environmental policy has its merits in the 
promotion of the diffusion of technologies. It 
can be observed, however, that policies 
promoting the diffusion do support incre-
mental innovations.  
There is considerable plausibility for the as-
sumption that autonomous emergence and 
diffusion of innovations in environmental 
technology is the exception rather than the 
rule and that such developments usually 
remain limited to incremental increases in 
efficiency in companies. The reverse bor-
der-line case is innovation in environmental 
policy where policy clearly exceeds the 
given technological possibilities. 
The limits of ecological modernization (in 
the "technocratic" sense) are thus defined 
by the limits of technology. However, these 
limits are dynamic. They can be extended 
by research (and by backing for research). 
For example, research into the development 
of procedures for reducing CO2 emissions, 
if successful, could substantially widen our 
room for manoeuvre in climate politics - 
even if only in the sense of end-of-pipe 
measures. The rapid diffusion of suitable 
policy innovations will then be as similarly 
predictable as the difficulty and slowness of 
a structural climate policy which de facto 
places restrictions on established energy 
markets (coal, oil).  
The variants of this interplay between policy 
and technology in any case are a central 
theme in research on the diffusion of envi-
ronmental innovations, especially when it 
comes to selectively optimising such inno-
vations.  
To summarise our main assumptions: 
• Ecological modernisation can be con-
ceived and has its strength as a market 
compatible strategy of technical envi-
ronmental innovations and their policy 
based diffusion. It is the nation state, 
which is playing a crucial role in this 
context.  
• The necessary pioneer role is a possible 
option for highly developed countries, 
many of them being especially open 
economies - there is no race to the bot-
tom in times of globalisation.  
• There is no general contradiction be-
tween competitiveness and demanding 
environmental policy, on the contrary, 
highly developed countries tend to inte-
grate the environmental issue into the 
competition on quality.  
• Global diffusion of best practice in envi-
ronmental policy takes place and is a 
major driving force for the diffusion of 
marketable, technical solutions for envi-
ronmental problems, that typically exist 
on a global scale 
If we are right, the creation of lead markets 
for environmental technologies would be a 
feasible global environmental strategy. 
5 Lead Markets for Environmental Technologies 
Lead markets are the geographical starting 
point of global diffusion processes. We un-
derstand lead-markets for environmental 
technologies as regional or national mar-
kets, which were stimulated by higher pref-
erences for environmental goods in a given 
country, specific supporting measures, or 
policy interventions, which are able to influ-
ence the markets in other regions effective-
ly, trigger reactions of adjustment and finally 
lead to an international diffusion of the new 
technologies. By this, we take again into ac-
count, that environmental innovations have 
to be largely ascribed to governmental (or 
NGO) activities. 
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Figure 5: Lead Markets for Environmental Technologies 
An environmental lead market is the core of the world market for a product or process where: 
• national policy or non-governmental influences successfully have created an incentive structure for 
users to adopt an innovation relating to a (manifest or latent) global environmental problem and  
• the global dimension of the problem creates a potential demand also in other geographic markets. 
• As a rule environmental lead markets are created by national policy innovations (e.g. standards) 
which potentially diffuse into other countries. There is a close interrelationship between policy  
innovation/diffusion and technical innovation/diffusion. 
• The diffusion of environmental policy innovations is supported both by horizontal imitation  
("benchmarking", "lesson-drawing") and by international organizations 
 
For a targeted ecological modernization of 
international markets the potential of nation 
states for a framing of national markets 
might gain considerable importance. The 
history of environmental protection is rich in 
examples for lead-markets: it encompasses 
the legally enforced introduction of catalytic 
converters for automobiles in the USA, de-
sulphurisation technologies in Japan, the 
Danish support for wind energy or the CFC 
free refrigerator in Germany. Another im-
pressive example is the global diffusion of 
chlorine-free paper, from the political activi-
ties by Greenpeace and the EPA in the 
USA, by way of the introduction of chlorine-
free paper whitener in Scandinavian coun-
tries and various Greenpeace campaigns in 
Germany and Austria, right through to effec-
tive political market intervention in south-
east Asian countries like Thailand 
(Mol/Sonnenfeld 2000). 
By setting up increasingly demanding envi-
ronmental standards, pioneer countries in 
environmental policy may send out a two-
fold signal beyond the boundaries of their 
national market: 
1. A national market for environmentally-
friendly technology acting as a basis for 
subsequent expansion to bigger mar-
kets. The pioneer country demonstrates 
the feasibility of its standards, regula-
tions. Subsequently the innovative regu-
lation is adopted by other countries. For 
example, the German tax preference for 
fuel-saving cars (1997) has supported 
suppliers in that country (Volkswagen, 
Mercedes). The diffusion of this instru-
ment, e.g. throughout the EU, can bring 
appropriate market expansion. Fre-
quently, the international diffusion is 
supported by the national producers, if 
they were able to adopt successfully to 
the new standards (examples in Jacob 
1999). A diffusion of regulations will be 
more likely if a country has attained the 
image of being a pioneer. It is only a few 
countries nowadays, mostly member 
states of the EU, which serve as the 
benchmark for the development of envi-
ronmental policy.  
2. The pioneer market with its demanding 
environmental regulations can, however, 
also send out signals to the supply side 
outside the domestic market. For exam-
ple, California, with its stricter emission 
rules compared with the rest of the USA, 
was able to exert a general influence on 
the car industry word-wide (Vogel 1995). 
Similarly, Denmark, in 1994, with its tar-
geted promotion of energy-efficient re-
frigerators, was able to prompt Euro-
pean suppliers to offer such devices 
there. In cases like these, competitive 
companies can advertise their ability to 
supply such demanding market areas as 
a sign of their technological compe-
tence. It can be cost efficient to orient 
the production on the highest standards, 
if there are scale effects. 
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An ongoing research project carried out for 
the German Ministry for Research and Edu-
cation BMBF on "ecological lead markets" 
(conducted by the DIW, FFU, IÖW, and 
ZEW) aims at identifying both framework 
conditions and policy measures for the es-
tablishment of lead markets on a more sys-
tematic empirical basis. Lead markets gen-
erally are "geographic markets which have 
the characteristic that product or process 
innovations, which are designed to fit local 
demand preferences and local...conditions, 
can subsequently be introduced success-
fully in other geographic markets as well 
and commercialized world-wide without 
many modifications. In the model of interna-
tional diffusion of innovations a lead market 
is the core of the world market where the lo-
cal users are early adopters of an innova-
tion on an international scale" (Beise, 1999: 
4). The U.S. as lead market for the internet, 
Japan as lead market for fax, or Finland as 
lead market for mobile phones are well-
known examples. Empirically lead markets 
are characterized as follows: 
General characteristics of lead markets (see 
also F. Meyer-Krahmer 1997): 
• High per-capita income, low price elas-
ticity 
• Demanding, innovative buyers, high 
quality standards 
• Problems, pressure for change and in-
novation 
• Flexible regulation, innovation-friendly 
framework conditions for producers and 
users 
• Product standards are acknowledged 
also in other countries. 
Lead markets for environmental technolo-
gies, however, are characterised by addi-
tional factors. They typically are not only 
stimulated by higher environmental prefer-
ences of consumers in that country, but also 
by special promotion measures, or by politi-
cal market intervention.  
They provide marketable solutions for global 
environmental needs, offering at least im-
provements for environmental problems 
which are mostly encountered worldwide or 
at least in a great many countries. Thus 
technological solutions to environmental 
problems enjoy, right from the outset and by 
their very nature, potentially larger markets. 
Lead markets affect competition in other 
market regions, trigger appropriate re-
sponses and adaptations, and thereby lead 
to the international diffusion of the new 
technology. The creation of lead markets for 
an environmental technology takes place in 
two stages, the first being the most impor-
tant: 
1. Struggling for success on the national 
market: This includes the establishment 
of a national market (not only a niche 
market), successful incremental im-
provements of the product and its pro-
duction. Government instruments may 
be standards, subsidies, charges, la-
bels, public procurement, network man-
agement, or EMAS (demand of firms). 
2. Government support for technology 
transfer by activities within international 
organizations (e. g. diffusion of the sup-
porting policy pattern), bilateral actions 
with strategic countries (e. g. the envi-
ronmental co-operation between Ger-
many and China), special international 
conferences, use of the international 
media, cooperation with international 
NGOs. More important may be - on the 
demand situation - the diffusion motor of 
benchmarking and search for best prac-
tices which in many countries is an insti-
tutionalised mechanism, today. In addi-
tion, the cooperation with multinational 
companies may be a relevant transfer 
mechanism. 
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Figure 6: Possible Functions of Environmental Lead-Markets 
Global Functions:  
• Problem solving function regarding global environmental needs 
• Return function for R & D and learning costs (possible in high-income countries) 
• Technological demonstration function (benchmarking) 
• Political demonstration function (lesson-drawing). 
National Functions: 
• Competitive function, potential first-mover-advantages  
• Potential attractiveness for foreign direct investments 
• Increased market value of environmental and technological reputation 
• Political legitimation function (for environmental policy, national policy actors as 
global players) 
 
If successfully established, such markets 
may fulfil a range of functions: From a 
global perspective they provide marketable 
solutions for typical environmental prob-
lems. Lead Markets in high-income coun-
tries are able to raise the necessary funds 
for refinancing the costs for development 
and "learning". This is true for environ-
mental innovations in particular since there 
is a need to survive the teething troubles of 
new technologies. They are demonstrating 
both the technical and the political feasibility 
and thereby giving a stimulus for other 
countries and enterprises to adopt to their 
pioneering standards. From a national per-
spective ambitious standards or support 
mechanisms might safeguard the first 
mover advantage for the own industries. 
Furthermore, ambitious policy measures 
can attract foreign investors which are inter-
ested in the development and marketing of 
environmental innovations. (It is not by 
chance that there have been recently some 
prominent investments for the production of 
solar cells or for fuel cells in Germany.) Fi-
nally, a demanding policy which holds eco-
nomic advantages additionally legitimates 
the national policy makers, sometimes pro-
viding them also with attractive roles in the 
global arena. 
6 The Limits to Ecological Modernization 
We use this "technocratic" concept of eco-
logical modernization, in its narrower sense, 
to describe the spectrum of technical, sys-
tem-compliant solutions for environmental 
problems. Ecological modernisation in this 
sense, however, comes up against its limits 
where potentially marketable technological 
standard solutions are not available. The so 
far unsolved environmental "persistent prob-
lems" - urban sprawl, loss of bio-diversity, 
soil erosion, groundwater pollution, final 
storage for nuclear waste, or the deteriora-
tion of global climate - all, so far, show up 
these limits. The modernization approach is 
also no viable option where the risk is acute 
and immediate defensive action is needed. 
If incremental increases in ecological effi-
ciency are not a causal, sustained solution, 
the environmental relief might be compen-
sated by subsequent growth processes. In 
this case, the effects of ecological moderni-
sation are compensated by growth A reduc-
tion in pollution tends to be followed by a 
resurgence. These facts were recognized 
as early as the late 1970s as the "dilemma 
of the N curve" (Jänicke 1979: 111). This di-
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lemma applies not only to clean-up envi-
ronmental protection (end-of-pipe treatment) 
but even to efficiency improvements. For 
example, Japanese industries, between 
1973 and 1985, succeeded in saving energy 
and raw materials in a remarkable way but 
the high industrial growth in those days 
simply devaluated this effect 
(Jänicke/Binder/Mönch 1997). The overall 
growth rate must thus always be accompa-
nied by equivalent progress in (compensa-
tory) technology providing environmental re-
lief. This "hare and tortoise-dilemma" of 
ecological modernization is even tightened if 
there are losers of modernisation: If it is not 
the polluting industry itself which finds new 
opportunities in environmental friendly 
products, the sector often seeks for new 
sales opportunities for the old product. For 
example, the successful campaigns of envi-
ronmentalists against using chlorine in ap-
plications free to the environment leading to 
a considerable reduction in production and 
consumption have since been compensated 
by the expansion of chlorine uses in other 
areas (Jacob 2001). 
What is needed in the long term therefore 
is, firstly, a transition from incremental to 
radical innovations in which ecologically 
problematic procedures and products are 
substituted by unproblematic ones (Kemp 
1997: 9). An example is the transition from 
efficiency improvement in coal-fired power 
plants to variants of solar energy. In be-
tween lie the border-line cases, a variety of 
incremental improvements which together 
represent a radically new quality (e.g. the 
zero-energy house). 
What is also needed are structural solu-
tions, i.e. solutions of a non-technical na-
ture, changes in the structure of demand 
and of industry, and, based on these, an 
ecological industrial policy. Finally for the 
areas that are difficult to control, namely life-
style, the level of personal mobility, and 
residential and housing structures, etc. have 
to be tackled by other means than technical 
approaches. Unlike the economic-technical 
variant of ecological modernization there 
are no marketable technical solutions to 
problems of that type.  
The much higher degree of political difficulty 
for an even cautious ecological industrial 
policy aiming at a restructuring away from 
the environmentally intensive "chimney in-
dustries" is indicated by the fact that there 
are hardly any examples for such a far 
reaching policy.  Examples so far, namely 
the running down of coal mining in the 
Netherlands or of crude steel works in Lux-
embourg, were hardly suitable for or capa-
ble of diffusion and are unlikely to find imita-
tors. Often, environmental objectives have-
n't been the driving force in these cases, al-
though there has been a considerable envi-
ronmental relief (Binder/Petschow/Jänicke 
2001). 
Finally, an innovation oriented environ-
mental policy is limited to those sectors 
where the target group has sufficient ca-
pacities to fulfil the expectations of environ-
mental policy. A strategy based on innova-
tion is more likely to be successful if the tar-
get group is small but encompasses potent 
actors. 
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